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Abstract— The development of the Internet of Things (IoT)
generates a significant amount of data that contains valuable
knowledge for system operations and business opportunities.
Since the data is the property of the IoT data owners, the
access to the data requires permission from the data owners,
which gives rise to a potential market opportunity for the
IoT data sharing and trading to create economic values and
market opportunities for both data owners and buyers. In
this work, we leverage optimal mechanism design theory to
develop a monopolist matching platform for data trading over
massive IoT networks. The proposed mechanism is composed
of a pair of matching and payment rules for each side of
the market. We analyze the incentive compatibility of the
market and characterize the optimal mechanism with a class
of cut-off matching rules for both welfare-maximization and
revenue-maximization mechanisms and study three matching
behaviors including complete-matched, bottom-eliminated, and
top-reserved.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT system generates tons of data that has a significant
amount of valuable knowledge hidden. Data collected for
fulfilling the individual tasks are often either deleted or
stored and locked down in independent data silos. On the
one hand, the data owners generally lack knowledge and
techniques to conduct knowledge discovery from their data
and can only gain access to their own data which has
little value with respect to knowledge discovery [1]. On the
other hand, the data consumers have abilities to discover
the hidden knowledge accurately and efficiently, but they
may not have a sufficient amount of targeted data or the
rights to access to the data due to privacy concerns. This
asymmetric relationship between the data owners and the
data consumers leads to a potential market opportunity for
the IoT data sharing.
In this work, we focus on massive IoT networks with a
sufficiently large number of data owners and data consumers
and develop a two-sided matching market model with a
monopolist trading platform for the IoT data sharing. This
model captures the different roles of data owners and data
consumers in dealing with data and conceptualizes the data
owners as the sellers and the data consumers as the buy-
ers. Sellers possess IoT data generated during the primary
usages of different IoT products to sell and have different
preferences for the payoffs from participation. On the other
hand, buyers offer rewards to the sellers for sharing their
data and have different requirements on the data, including,
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for example, its features (e.g., category, history, quality, and
quantity of the data), the users’ engagements with the IoT
system (e.g., the usage frequency of IoT products), and the
users’ personal information (e.g., life styles and financial
status). We consider that there is a monopolist intermediary
matching platform (platform) that takes advantage of this
market opportunity to offer a matching mechanism that
enables and encourages interactions between two sides of
participants and matches sellers and buyers based on their
private information that summarizes their preferences.
The matching mechanism consists of a matching rule and
a payment rule. The matching rule matches the owners and
the buyers by specifying the datasets that can provide the
highest utility for the buyers and determines the rewards
the owners can receive from the buyers. As a result, the
matching rules produce welfare for owners and buyers.
The payment rule specifies the payments from each side
of the market once a match is established that generate
revenues to the platform. The proposed model considers
the interactions between a large number of owners and
buyers and study the matching mechanisms for revenue
and welfare maximization [2], respectively. We describe
a class of threshold matching rules and show that under
certain assumptions both the welfare-maximizing and the
revenue-maximizing matching mechanisms have optimal cut-
off matching rules. We study different matching behaviors
and characterize different matching patterns based on the
joint marginal effect of matching two individual participants
on the platform’s mechanism design goal. An numerical
example is provided to illustrate the theoretical analysis of
this work.
This work is related to matching mechanism design for
matching two-sided market (e.g., one-to-one matching [3]
and many-to-many matching [4]). There is a rich literature
on the economic analysis and pricing schemes of the market
model for data collection in IoT networks [5]–[7] based
on a variety of approaches, including smart data pricing
scheme [8] such as sealed-bit auctions [9]. Also, utility
maximization-based pricing schemes have also been stud-
ied [10], [11]. For example, in [12], an optimal dynamic
spectrum reservation contract has been designed for mission-
critical IoT systems, in which an advance payment is made
at the time of reservation and a rebate is made if the
reservation is released. The IoT applications are incentivized
to reveal the true application type and it has been shown
that the incentive compatible mechanism leads to an efficient
utilization of the spectrum as well as a greater revenueability
of the IoT network operator.
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II. IOT DATA MARKET
A. Market Model
1) Information structure: There are two sides in the IoT
data market: the seller side (S) consisting of participants
that are data owners, and the buyer side (B) consisting of
participants who are the data buyers. We use K to denote one
side K ∈ {S,B} and K¯ to denote its opposite K¯ ∈ {S,B}\{K}.
We consider a massive IoT networks, in which there is a
sufficiently large number of participants on both sides of
the market, and each participant has no market power. As a
result, we model the population of each side of the market as
a unit-mass continuum of participants over [0,1]. Each par-
ticipant from side K has a type λK ∈ΛK = [λK , λ¯K ]∈R. We
assume that λK is drawn independently from a continuous
distribution FK(λK) with density f K(λK). Each seller’s type
λ S ∈ λ S summarizes the feature of her data (including, e.g.,
quality, categories, or cost performance). On the other hand,
each buyer’s type λB ∈ λB summarizes her requirements of
data (e.g., quality, quantity) and the offers she can provide to
the sellers. The type of each participant from one side also
reflects the attractiveness of the participant seen by those in
the other side of the market. We assume that for any two
types λKh ∈ λK and λK` ∈ λK , participants of λKh is more
attractive than those of λK` if λ
K
` < λ
K
h , e.g., buyers prefer to
be matched to sellers of higher cost performance and sellers
prefer to be matched to buyers of better offers. Informally, let
C(λ S,λB) represent the contribution generated by matching
one seller of λ S to one buyer of λB to the platform’s goal.
The following assumption specifies a monotone property of
C(λ S,λB).
Assumption 1. Let λKh , λ
K
` ∈ ΛK be any two types from
side K ∈ {S,B}, with λK` ≤ λKh . Then, for a ∈ {h, `} and
a¯ ∈ {h, `}\{a},
C(λ S` ,λ
B
` )≤C(λ Sa ,λBa¯ )≤C(λ Sh ,λBh ).
Assumption 1 claims that the matching mechanism satis-
fies a monotone property, i.e., matching a seller of higher
cost performance to a buyer of better offer generates higher
contribution than matching participants of lower cost perfor-
mance or lower offer.
However, each participant’s type is her own private infor-
mation and the matching mechanism requires each partici-
pant to report her type to the platform through a message.
Due to this information asymmetry, each participant can
game the system to her own advantage by strategically
reporting her type to the platform. Let ΩK denote the
set of messages a participant from K can choose. Define
participant’s reporting strategy αK : ΛK 7→ ΩK , such that a
participant reports a message mK = αK(λK) when her true
type is λK . We consider the direct mechanism, in which
participants directly reveal their type (truthfully or falsified),
i.e, ΩK = ΛK . We say the participant’s reporting strategy is
truthful if αK(λK) = λK , for all λK ∈ ΛK , K ∈ {S,B}.
2) Mechanism rules: The data market is driven by the
platform (he), who operates as a data market maker that
provides a matching mechanism consisting of a matching
rule that matches participants from one side to those from
the other side and a payment rule that charges participants
from each matched participant by a proper price. Let σK :
ΛK 7→ P(ΛK¯) denote the matching rule for side K ∈ {S,B},
where P(ΛK¯) denotes the power set of ΛK¯ , such that σK(λˆK)
gives the set of types on the side K¯ that a participant of
reported type λˆK ∈ ΛK is matched to. Let ΞK ⊆ ΛK denote
any subset of ΛK . This point-to-set mapping captures the fact
that a database may be sold to multiple buyers of different
types and a buyer may buy multiple databases from sellers of
different types. Let φK : ΛK 7→R+ denote the payment rule,
such that φK(λˆK) specifies a payment that the participant
reporting λˆK needs to pay to the platform for being matched.
Let σ = {σS,σB} and φ = {φ S,φB}. The matching rule σ is
feasible if it satisfies a reciprocal relationship: if a participant
of λK is matched to a participant of λ K¯ from the opposite
side, then the participant of λ K¯ must also be matched to the
participant of λK , i.e., for K ∈ {S,B}, K¯ ∈ {S,B}\{K},
λK ∈ σ K¯(λ K¯), if and only if, λ K¯ ∈ σK(λK). (1)
The reciprocal relationship (1) holds when λK and λ K¯ are
the reports sent by the matched participants.
3) Utility and Payoff: In the data market, the sellers
are motivated to participate by the reward they may obtain
by sharing their data to the buyers, while the buyers are
motivated by the benefits of utilizing the data. Basically,
the buyers acknowledge the (potential) value of data and
recognize the importance of providing the reward to motivate
the sellers to share their data. Let γB : ΛB 7→ Γ⊂R+ denote
the reward, such that r = γB(λB) is the reward offered by
the buyer of type λB to each of her matched sellers. Let
MK : R+×ΛK 7→ R+ denote the monetary evaluation of the
reward by participants from K, K ∈ {S,B}. Hence, MS(r,λ S)
is the monetary value of the reward r perceived by the
seller of λ S. On the other hand, the shared data produces
value to the buyers from utilizing the data. Define the data
value as γS :ΛS 7→R+, such that MB(γS(λ S),λB) is the data
value provided by seller of λ S that is recognized by the
buyer of λB. We assume that MK and γK are continuous
and differentiable and they are fixed and known by all
participants and the platform. Additionally, we assume that
γB(λB) ≤ MS(γB(λB),λ S), i.e., the cost of offering r =
γB(λB) by type-λB buyer is less than the monetary value of
r as seen as a reward by the type-λ S seller. This assumption
is based on the setting that the reward may not be a direct
monetary transfer but through the terms of services, products,
or vouchers from the buyers’ business, in which the buyers’
cost is in general lower than the tagged price.
Given σK , define the utility function as uK(·, ·|σK ,αK) :
ΛK × P(ΛK¯) 7→ R+, such that uK(λK ,ΞK¯ |σK ,αK)
specifies the utility for a participant from K when
her true type is λK and she adopts reporting strategy
αK . Let RS(λ S,λB|σS,αS) = MS(γB(λB),λ S) and
RB(λB,λ S|σB,αB) = MB(γS(λ S),λB) − γB(αB(λB)).
Then, for K ∈ {S,B}, K¯ ∈ {S,B}\{K},
uK(λK ,ΞK¯ |σK ,αK) =
∫
ΞK¯
RK(λK ,x|σK ,αK) f K¯(x)dx. (2)
We have the following assumption of uK .
Assumption 2. The utility uK(λK ,σK(λˆK)|σK ,αK) is a
continuous in λK and non-decreasing in report λˆK .
It is straightforward to verify that the utility uK satisfying
Assumption 2 coincides with the monotonicity of C in
Assumption 1.
Define payoff function, JK(·|σK ,φK ,αKi ) : ΛK × R+ ×
P(ΛK¯) 7→R, of a participant of λK from K, when she adopts
reporting strategy αK ,
JK(λK , pK ,ΞK¯
∣∣σK ,φK ,αKi ) = uK(λK ,ΞK¯∣∣σS)− pK . (3)
To simplify the notations, we remove the rules and strategy
σK , φK , and αK in the left-hand side of JK , unless otherwise
stated.
III. MATCHING MECHANISM
In the letter, we focus on the anonymous mechanism de-
sign. Specifically, the set of participants from side K¯ ∈ {S,B}
is matched to a participant of λK from K ∈ {S,B}\{K¯}
and the associated payments depend only on the reported
type λˆK = σK(λK). Let σKi (λKi ) ∈ ΛK and σKj (λKj ) ∈ ΛK
be the types of two participants i and j, respectively. If
σKi (λKi ) = σKj (λKj ),then both participants i and j receive the
same matched set ΞK¯ and payment pK . This is because the
matching rule σK and payment rule φK , respectively, specify
a match and a payment that depend only on her reported type
and are independent of other participants from the same side
K. As a result, the identity of each participant can be fully
characterized by her reported type.
Due to the revelation principle [13], our model considers
the direct mechanism and requires the matching mechanism
to incentivize all the participants from both sides to re-
port their types truthfully. This is established by imposing
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint to the platform’s
mechanism design problem.
Definition 1 (Individual Compatibility). The matching
mechanism < σ ,φ > is incentive compatible if
JK
(
λK ,φK
(
λK
)
,σK
(
λK
))≥ JK(λK ,φK(λˆK),σK(λˆK)),
(4)
for any λK , λˆK ∈ ΛK .
In incentive compatible matching mechanism, the truthful
reporting strategy is the (weakly) dominant strategy for
each participant. The following definition shows a first-
order condition for incentive compatibility (ICFOC) based
on envelope theorem.
Definition 2 (ICFOC). A matching mechanism < σ ,φ >
satisfies ICFOC if JK
(
λK ,φK
(
λK
)
,σK
(
λK
))
is a contin-
uous and differentiable function of λK with the derivative
given almost everywhere by
∂JK
(
x,φK(x),σK(x)
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=λK
=
∂
∂x
uK(x,σK(λK)|σK)
∣∣∣
x=λK
.
(5)
The ICFOC condition in Definition 2 implies that the
payoff of each matched participant can be characterized by
the matching rule σK , K ∈ {S,B}. Define
DK(λK) =
∂
∂x
uK(x,σK(λK)|σK)
∣∣∣
x=λK
, (6)
and
QK(λK) =
∫ λK
λ˜K
DK(x)dx, (7)
where λ˜K ∈ΛK is some arbitrarily fixed type. Here, QK(λK)
can be interpreted as the advantage (an economic rent)
a participant of λK has over some type λ˜K due to the
platform’s not knowing that her true type is λK . For example,
if JK is an increasing function of λK , then QK(λK) with
λ˜K = λK is the maximum advantage a participant of λK
holds. In this example, it is straightforward to see that
participants of λ¯K have no incentive to misreport their true
type, while participants of λK have incentive to misreport
λK as λ¯K because she has no advantage by truthful reporting
compared to any type λK > λK . Hence, due to the ICFOC,
guaranteeing the IC constraint requires to craft the payment
rule such that advantages (or disadvantages) that different
types hold in the utilities can be balanced. The following
proposition shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for
matching mechanisms being incentive compatible.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. A matching
mechanism < σ ,φ > is incentive compatible if and only if
the payment rule is constructed as follows, for all K ∈ {S,B},
φK(λK) =uK(λK ,σK(λK))−
∫ λK
λK
DK(x)dx
−JK(λK ,φK(λK),σK(λK)),
(8)
where DK is given in (6).
The construction of φK in (8) can be interpreted as the
utility of truthfully reporting λK , advantage of type λK over
λK , and the payoff of λK . Proposition 1 also requires that
the payoff of the lowest type λK is designed by choosing a
constant. Given the IC constraint, we rewrite the payoff in
(3) as JK(λK |σK ,φK).
Another important constraint in our matching mechanism
design is the individual rationality (IR) constraint. In ad-
dition to the IC constraint, the IR constraint requires that
the payoff of each participant of λK is non-negative, i.e.,
JK(λK |σK ,φK)≥ 0, for all λK ∈ ΛK , K ∈ {S,B}.
A. Revenue and Welfare Maximization
The expected social welfare generated by the matching
mechanism is given as
ZW (σ ,φ ) = ∑
K∈{S,B}
∫
ΛK
uK(x,σK(x)|σK) f K(x)dx, (9)
and the expected revenue obtained by the platform is given
as
ZR(σ ,φ ) = ∑
K∈{S,B}
∫
ΛK
φK(x) f K(x)dx. (10)
By substituting the construction of φK in (8) into (10), we
have
ZR(σ ,φ ) = ∑
K∈{S,B}
∫
ΛK
[
uK(x,σK(x)|σK)−
∫ x
λK
DK(r)dr
− JK(λK |σK ,φK)
]
f K(x)dx.
(11)
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. In the incentive
compatible matching mechanism < σ ,φ >, the followings
hold.
(i) The mechanism is individually rational if and only if,
for K ∈ {S,B},
JK(λK |σK ,φK)≥ 0. (12)
(ii) In the matching mechanism that maximizes the social
welfare ZW (σ ,φ ), JK(λK |σK ,φK) = 0.
B. Cut-off Rule
In this section, we describe a class of matching mechanism
based on a cut-off rule. Let τK(·|δK) : ΛK 7→ ΛK¯ , for K ∈
{S,B}, be the cut-off function with the threshold δK ∈ ΛK ,
such that the matching rule is defined as follows:
σK(λK) =[τK(λK |δK), λ¯K ]1{λK≥δK}+ /01{λK<δK},
(13)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. The matching rule in (13)
can be interpreted as, for example, the seller with overall data
quality characterized by λ S that is at least δ S is matched to
buyers whose data requirements (and the associated reward)
characterized by λB is at least τS(λ S|δ S); otherwise the seller
is not matched. Similar interpretation can be made for the
buyers’ side.
The following definition shows the conditions of the cut-
off based matching rules such that the reciprocal relationship
in (1) is satisfied.
Definition 3 (Cut-Off Matching Rule). The cutoff rule
in (13) is a feasible matching rule if (i) τK(λK |δK) =
inf{λ K¯ : τ K¯(λ K¯ |δ K¯)≤ λK} ; (ii) δK = inf{λK : τ K¯(λ K¯ |δ K¯)≤
λK ,λ K¯ ∈ ΛK¯}; (iii) τK(λK |δK) is non-increasing in λK .
In Definition 3, the conditions (i) and (ii) specify the
reciprocal relationships of the cut-off functions and the
thresholds between sides S and B and the condition (iii)
specifies the monotonicity of the cut-off function, such that
the matching rule defined in (13) is feasible, i.e. (1) is
satisfied.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, matching
rules of the welfare-maximizing and the revenue-maximizing
mechanisms are cut-off rules.
Hence, the platform’s mechanism design problem is to
maximize the social welfare or his revenue by determining
the cut-off functions τ = {τS,τB} with thresholds δ =
{δ S,δB} and the payment rule φ , i.e., for Y ∈ {W,R},
max
τ ,δ ,φ
ZY ({τ ,δ },φ )
s.t. IC, IR, and (i)-(iii) in Definition 3.
(14)
IV. CHARACTERIZATION THE MATCHING MECHANISM
From Assumption 2, it is straightforward to see that both
sellers and buyers prefer a match to opponents of higher
types, i.e., τK(λK |δK) ≤ λ¯ K¯ , for all λK ∈ ΛK , K ∈ {S,B},
and K¯ ∈ {S,B}\{K}, given that IC and IR constraints are
satisfied. Their preferences over the opponents of lower
types, however, may exhibit inconsistency between two sides.
Suppose a seller of λ S ∈ ΛS is matched to a buyer of λB.
Then the seller receives a reward MS(γB(γB),λ S) and the
buyer receives a reward MB(γS(λ S),λB)− γB(λB). Since
γB(λB) is non-negative and the same data can be copied
multiple times without additional cost, the seller also prefers
to be matched to buyers of a wide range of types. The
buyers, on the other hand, may receives negative reward by
being matched to lower types. As a result, buyers of some
types may not prefer to be matched to sellers of (sufficiently)
low types. We define the following matching patterns when
the platform adopts the cut-off matching rule defined in
Definition 3.
Definition 4 (Matching Patterns). We consider the follow-
ing match patterns, for K ∈ {S,B}, K¯ ∈ {S,B}\{K}.
(i) Complete-matched on side K: δK = λK .
(ii) Bottom-eliminated on side K: δK > λK .
(iii) Top-reserved on side K: τ K¯(δ K¯ |δ K¯)< λ¯K .
Here, complete-matched on side K means all participants
on side K are matched to (some or all of) participants on
side K¯. If the market is bottom-eliminated on side K, then
the participants of types in [λK ,δK) are not matched to any
participants. If the market is top-reserved on side K, then
there is a group of types in the top subset [τ K¯(δ K¯ |δ K¯) that
are matched to all the participants on side K¯ whose types
are in [δ K¯ , λ¯ K¯ ], i.e., those are not bottom-eliminated on side
K¯.
Based on the cut-off rule, we can rewrite the utility
function in (2) as follows, with a slight abuse of notation:
uK(λK ,τK(λK |δK)|σK) =
∫ λ¯ K¯
τK(λK |δK)
RK(λK ,x|σK) f K¯(x)dx.
(15)
The platform’s revenue in (11) can be rewritten, by setting
JK(λK |σK ,φK) = 0 and integral by parts as follows:
ZR(σ ,φ ) = ∑
K∈{S,B}
∫
ΛK
[
uK(x,τK(x|δK)|σK)
−DK(x)1−F
K(x)
f K(x)
]
f K(x)dx.
(16)
Then, the virtual surpluses of the welfare and the revenue
maximization of the participant of λK , respectively, are as
follows: for K ∈ {S,B},
UKW (λ
K ,τK(λK |δK)) = uK(λK ,τK(λK |δK)|σK), (17)
and
UKR (λ
K ,τK(λK |δK))
=uK(λK ,τK(λK |δK)|σK)−DK(λK)1−F
K(λK)
f K(λK)
.
(18)
Suppose a participant has the type λK ∈ [τ K¯(λ K¯), λ¯K ], i.e.,
she is matched to participants from K¯ of type λ K¯ and other
participants whose types are above λ K¯ . Hence, the marginal
effect of this participant on the utility of the participants from
K¯ of λ K¯ can be modeled as
ω K¯(λK) =γK(λK) f K(λK). (19)
The direct marginal effect of this participant (not from
influencing the matched participants from K¯ through the
matching rule) on the social welfare defined in (10) is
proportional to the following, for some arbitrarily fixed non-
zero λ K¯∆ ∈ ΛK¯ ,
θKW (λ
K ,λ K¯∆ ) =−
∂
∂x
UKW (λ
K ,x) f K(λK)
∣∣∣
x=λ K¯∆
. (20)
Similarly, the direct marginal effect of participant i on the
platform’s revenue defined in (9) is proportional to the
following, for some arbitrary fixed λ K¯∆ ∈ ΛK¯ ,
θKR (λ
K ,λ K¯∆ ) =−
∂
∂x
UKR (λ
K ,x) f K(λK)
∣∣∣
x=λ K¯∆
. (21)
We have the following assumption.
Assumption 3. For K ∈ {S,B}, Y ∈ {W,R}, θKY (λK ,λ K¯∆ )
ω K¯(λK)
is
a strictly increasing function of λK , for any fixed non-zero
λ K¯∆ ∈ ΛK¯ .
In Assumption 3, the term θ
K
Y (λ
K ,λ K¯∆ )
ω K¯(λK)
is the ratio of a
participant of λK’s direct marginal contribution to ZY , Y ∈
{W,R}, and her marginal contribution to each of her matched
participants from K¯. Assumption 3 requires that the direct
marginal contribution of a participant of λK to the social
welfare or the platform’s revenue changes faster than her
marginal contribution to any of her matched opponents from
K¯ through the matching rule.
Define, for K ∈ {S,B}, Y ∈ {W,R},
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) = θKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)+θ K¯Y (λ
K¯ ,λK). (22)
Here, ηKY (λK ,λ K¯) is the joint marginal effect of matching λK
to λ K¯ to the social welfare (Y =W ) or platform’s revenue
(Y = R) if they are matched. Here, ηKY coincides with the
contribution C in Assumption 1.
The following proposition shows the uniqueness of the
cut-off functions.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. If
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0, for Y ∈ {W,R}, K ∈ {S,B}, then the cut-off
function τK specifies a unique matched lowest type for each
type on side K, i.e., τK(λK |δK) 6= τK(λ˜K |δK), for any two
different λK , λ˜K ∈ [δK , λ¯K ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following proposition shows the conditions under
which the market exhibits certain matching patterns.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then,
the followings are ture.
(i) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)≥ 0, then the market is complete-matched
on both sides of the market, for Y ∈ {W,R}, K ∈ {S,B}.
(ii) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0 and ηKY (λ¯K ,λ
K¯)> 0, then the market
is top-reserved on side K and complete-matched on
side K¯. Additionally τK(λK |δK) = δ K¯ for all λK ∈
[τ K¯ |δ K¯ , λ¯K ].
(iii) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0 and ηKY (λ¯K ,λ
K¯)< 0, then the market
is not top-reserved on side K and bottom-eliminated on
side K¯.
(iv) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0 and ηKY (λ¯K ,λ
K¯)= 0, then the market
is not top-reserved on side K and complete-matched on
side K¯.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Without loss of generality, we refer to K as the seller
and K¯ as the buyer and focus on the social welfare maxi-
mization, i.e., Y = W . In Proposition 3, ηSW (λ
S,λB) is the
joint marginal effect of matching the sellers’ lowest type
λ S to the buyers lowest type λB. It ηSW (λ
S,λB) ≥ 0, then
ηSW (λ
S,λB) ≥ 0 for all λ S ∈ ΛS and λB ∈ ΛB due to the
monotonicity in Assumption 2. If ηSW (λ
S,λB)< 0, then the
lowest types should not be matched because they contribute
negatively to the social welfare. Here, ηSW (λ¯
S,λB) measures
the joint marginal effect of matching a seller of the highest
type λ¯ S to a buyer of the lowest type λB. Together with
ηSW (λ
S,λB) < 0, ηSW (λ¯
S,λB) > 0 means that buyers of the
lowest type can generate positive contribution to the social
welfare, which implies that buyers of all kinds of types are
matched to sellers and τB(λB|δB) < λ¯ S, i.e., top-reserved,
due to the non-increasing property of τB. On the other
hand, ηSW (λ
S,λB) < 0 and ηSW (λ¯
S,λB) < 0 imply that the
buyers of the lowest type should be eliminated from being
matched. This exhibits the bottom-eliminated on the buyer
side, i.e., δB > λB. Hence, τB(δB|δB) < τB(λB|δB). Since
λB is excluded (and not matched to λ¯ S), τB(δB|δB) = λ¯ S,
i.e., the buyers of lowest matched type is matched only to the
sellers of the highest type. From the reciprocal relationship,
measuring ηBW on λ
S, λB, and λ¯ S can complete the matching
patterns on both sides. Corollary 2 directly follows Proposi-
tions 2 and 3.
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then, the
followings hold.
(i) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0, then ηKY (λK ,τK(λK |δK)) = 0.
(ii) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) < 0 and ηKY (λ¯K ,λ
K¯) < 0, then
τ K¯(δ K¯ |δ K¯) = λ¯K .
(iii) If ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) < 0 and ηKY (λ¯K ,λ
K¯) = 0, then
τ K¯(λ K¯ |λ K¯) = λ¯K .
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 1: (a): Welfare-maximizing matching rule. δK = λK and τK(λK |δK) = λ K¯ . i.e., each data seller is matched to all data
buyers. (b): Revenue-maximizing matching rule. Each data seller of λ S is matched to all data buyers of λB ∈ [τS(λ S| 409 ),10],
where τS(λ S| 72 ) = 10λ
S−5
4λ S−11 . (c): Welfare vs. δ
K . When δK = 1, the welfare reaches its maximum, i.e., τ K¯(δ K¯ |δ K¯) = λK . (d):
Marginal Revenue vs. λ S. The platform has a non-negative marginal revenue for λ S ≥ 72 . τS(λ S| 72 ) = 10λ
S−5
4λ S−11 is optimal and
specifies a unique cut-off for each λ S ∈ [ 72 ,10].
A. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we present a numerical example for the
matching to illustrate the optimal matching rules for the
social welfare and the platform’s revenue maximization. Fig.
1 shows the numerical results. Consider the case when
ΛK = [1,10], γS(λ S) = λ S, γB(λB) = 12λ
B, MK(r,λK) =
CKλKr, with CS = 1 and CB = 12 , for K ∈ {S,B}. Let
RS(λ S,λB|σS) = 12λ SλB and RB(λB,λ S|σB) = 12λB(λ S− 12 ).
Suppose the type λK is uniformly distributed over ΛK , for
K ∈ {S,B}, i.e., FK(λK) = λK−19 , and f K(λK) = 19 . Then,
ωB(λ S) = 19λ
S, ωS(λB) = 118λ
B, θ SW (λ
S,λB∆ ) =
1
18λ
B
∆ λ
S,
θBW (λB,λ S∆) =
1
18λ
B(λ S∆ − 12 ), θ SR(λ S,λB∆ ) = 19λB∆ (λ S − 5),
θBR (λB,λ S∆) =
1
9 (λ
B − 5)(λ S − 12 ). It is straightforward to
verify that Assumption 3 holds on both sides of the market
for both the social welfare and the revenue maximization.
For K ∈ {S,B},
ηKW (λ
K ,λ K¯) =
1
36
λB(4λ S−1),
ηKR (λ
K ,λ K¯) =
1
9
(2λBλ S−5λ S− 11
2
λB+
5
2
).
Since ηKW (λK ,λ K¯)> 0 for all λK ∈ ΛK and λ K¯ ∈ ΛK¯ , social
welfare maximizing matching rule matches all sellers to all
buyers and reciprocally all buyers to all sellers. For revenue
maximization, since ηKR (1,1)< 0, for K ∈{S,B}, Proposition
2 implies that the matching rule sets a unique τK(λK |δK) for
each λK ∈ [δK , λ¯K ]. On the seller side, ηSR(10,1) =− 339 < 0.
One the buyer side, ηBR (10,1) =− 752 < 0. Hence, Proposition
3 implies that the market is bottom-eliminated and not top-
reserved on both sides. From Corollary 2, we have
τS(λ S|δ S) = 10λ
S−5
4λ S−11 ,
with δ S = 72 , and
τB(λB|δB) = 11λ
B−5
4λB−10 ,
with δB = 9529 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a two-sided matching mar-
ket framework for IoT data trading as a sustainable pricing
model that incentivizes both the data sellers and the data
buyers. A monopolist platform has been introduced to match
the data owners and the data buyers based on their private
information. We have established a quantitative framework
to model the IoT data trading market for the welfare and the
revenue maximization. This work has characterized a class
of feasible cut-off matching rules. Under mild assumptions
of the utility functions and the distributions of the valuations,
there exist optimal cut-off matching rules that maximize
the welfare and the revenue. We have provided numerical
example to understand the matching patterns of participants
from both sides of the market.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Expanding θKW and θKR as follows:
θKW (λ
K ,λ K¯) =− ∂
∂x
UKW (λ
K ,x) f K(λK)
∣∣∣
x=λ K¯
=RK(λK ,λ K¯ |σK) f K¯(λ K¯) f K(λK),
and
θKR (λ
K ,λ K¯∆ ) =−
∂
∂x
UKR (λ
K ,x) f K(λK)
∣∣∣
x=λ K¯∆
=RK(λK ,λ K¯ |σK) f K¯(λ K¯) f K(λK)
+
∂
∂x
RK(x,λ K¯ |σK) f K¯(λ K¯)(1−FK(λK)).
Define,
ρKW (λ
K ,λ K¯) = RK(λK ,λ K¯ |σK) f K(λ K¯),
and
ρKR (λ
K ,λ K¯) =RK(λK ,λ K¯ |σK) f K(λ K¯)
+
∂
∂x
RK(x,λ K¯ |σK)(1−FK(λK)),
such that θKY (λK ,λ K¯) = ρKY (λK ,λ K¯) f K¯(λ K¯).
If ρKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) < 0, for all K ∈ {S,B}, Y ∈ {W,R}, then
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0. Let τK(|δK) be the matching rule that sat-
isfies the uniqueness property in Proposition 2. Let τˆK(|δˆK)
with threshold δˆK be the cut-off function that does not
specify unique matched cut-off types for different types.
Hence, participants from side K are excluded from matching
if λK < δˆK . Otherwise, participants from side K are matched
to participants from side K¯ whose types are above δˆ K¯ .
Let gKY = inf{λK ∈ ΛK : ρKY ≥ 0}. Suppose the platform
adopts the unique matching rule τK that matches each
participant of type λK ≥ δˆK to the same set as the non-unique
matching rule τˆK and matches each participant of type λK ∈
[gKY , δˆK ] to the set [λ˜ K¯ , λ¯ K¯ ], where λ˜ K¯ =max{gKY , δˆK}. Then,
the platform can increase his payoff (utilities or revenues) by
switching τˆK to τK .
Now, suppose δˆK < gKY for K ∈ {S,B}. Let τKΩ be defined
as follows:
τKΩ(λ
K)

[δˆ K¯ , λ¯ K¯ ] if, [gKY , v¯K ]
[gK¯Y , λ¯K ] if, [δˆK ,gKY ]
/0 if, [λK , δˆK ].
By adopting τKΩ , the platform can improve his payoff than
using the original τˆK with δ¯K because all types that lead to
negative ρKY are eliminated, for K ∈ {S,B}, Y ∈ {S,B}.
Next, suppose δˆ = gKY , for K ∈{S,B} and δˆ K¯ ≤ gK¯Y , for K¯ ∈
{S,B}\{K}, Y ∈ {W,R}. Let δ˜K + ε = gKY with sufficiently
small ε > 0. Define
τKΩ(λ
K)

[δˆ K¯ , λ¯ K¯ ] if, [gKY , v¯K ]
[gK¯Y , λ¯K ] if, [δ˜K ,gKY ]
/0 if, [λK , δ˜K ].
Here, participants of type λK ∈ [δ˜K ,gKY ] contribute negatively
to the platform’s payoff but they are sufficiently small
such that they do not offset the positive contribution from
participants of types in [gKY , v¯
K ]. Hence, the platform can
increase his payoff by using τKΩ to replace the original τˆ
K
with δˆK .
Now, consider ρ K¯Y (λ
K¯ ,λK) < 0 ≤ ρKY (λK ,λ K¯),
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) < 0 and the platform adopts a non-unique
cut-off function. First, suppose that the market is complete-
matched on both sides, i.e., δˆK = λK , τ K¯(λ K¯) = λK . Since
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯)< 0, the platform’s effort of increasing τK(λK ,)
above λ K¯ while keeping the cut-off type unchanged for all
other types on side K contributes to his payoff positively.
Hence, the platform can improve his payoff by using the
unique cut-off by increasing τK at the right neighborhood of
λK while keeping the cut-off type unchanged for all other
types on side K.
Next, suppose that the original cut-off function eliminates
some participants and match each of the participants of types
above δˆK to the same matched set. As similar to the above
analysis, optimal rule has to be in the case when δˆ K¯ < gK¯Y
and δˆK = λK , and ∫
ΛK
ηKY (x, δˆ
K¯)dx = 0
which requires that the total effect of an increase of the size
of the matched set on K¯ is zero. From Assumption 3, we
have there exists a λK∆ ∈ ΛK such that
∫ λ¯K
λK∆
ηKY (x, δˆ K¯)dx> 0.
Thus, there exists a δK∆ < ωˆ
K such that the platform can
improve his payoff by using the following cut-off functions,
instead of the original cut-off function:
τKΩ(λ
K)
{
[δK∆ , λ¯
K¯ ] if, [λK∆ , v¯
K ]
[ωˆK , λ¯K ] if, [λK ,λK∆ ].
Therefore, we can conclude that unique cut-off rule is
optimal for the platform.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Let ρKY be defined in Appendix A, such that θKY (λK ,λ K¯)=
ρKY (λK ,λ K¯) f K¯(λ K¯).
If ρKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) ≥ 0, for all K ∈ {S,B}, Y ∈ {W,R}, then
ηKY (λK ,λ K¯)≥ 0. The monotonicity of the ρKY implies that the
social welfare (Y =W ) and the platform’s revenue (Y = R)
are maximized by matching all sellers to all buyers. Hence,
the market is complete-matched on both sides.
Next, consider ρ K¯Y (λ
K¯ ,λK) < 0 ≤ ρKY (λK ,λ K¯). Suppose
ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) ≥ 0, then the platform uses a matching rule
τKΓ (λ
K)≥ vK¯ for some λK ∈ΛK . Let λKa be any type in ΛK ,
such that τK is strictly decreasing at the right neighborhood
of λKa . Hence, the marginal effect of reducing τK(λK) below
λ K¯ is ηKY (λK ,λ K¯). Let [λK` ,λ
K
h ]⊂ ΛK , in which τK(λK) =
λ K¯ for all λK ∈ [λK` ,λKh ], i.e., τK specifies a constant cut-off
type λ K¯ , in which the marginal effect of the reduction of
τK(λK) below λ K¯ is
∫ λKh
λK`
ηKY (x,λ K¯)dx. Under Assumption
3, we have ηKΓ (λ
K ,λ K¯)> 0 for any λK ∈ ΛK and λ K¯ ∈ ΛK¯ ,
which implies that a complete-matched pattern for both sides
is optimal. Let gKY = inf{λK ∈ ΛK : ρKY ≥ 0}.
The platform’s objective functions can be written in terms
of UKY as follows: for Y ∈ {W,R},
ZY ({τ ,δ }) = ∑
K∈S,B
∫ λ¯K
δK
UKY (x,τ
K(x)) f K(x)dx
Since ηKY (λ
K ,λ K¯) < 0, gKY > λ
K . From Appendix A,
δK ∈ [(λ )K ,gKY ] at the optimum. Moreover, δ K¯Y ∈ [λ K¯ ,gKY ] and
τK(gKY ) = gK¯Y . Assume that gKY > λ
K¯ . (If not, then δ K¯ = λ K¯
and τKK (λK) = λ
K for all vk ≥ gKY ).
Hence, we can partition ZY into two independent problem,
for K ∈ S,B,
ZKY =
∫ gKY
δK
UKY (x,τ
K(x)) f K(x)dx+ int λ¯
K¯
gK¯Y
U K¯Y (x,τ
K¯(x)) f barK(x)dx.
Here, the problem ZKY can be solved piecewisely. Let λK∆ =
inf{λK ∈ [λK ,gKY ] :ηKY (λK ,κ(λK))= 0}. Then, the following
cut-off function maximizes ZKY :
τ˜K(λK) =
{
λ¯ K¯ if, λK ∈ [λK ,λK∆ ],
κ(λK) if, λK ∈ (λK∆ , λ¯K ].
Next, let cut-off function associated to the matching rule
τK = τ˜K for any λK ∈ [λK∆ ,gKY ]. Given τK : [δK ,gKY ] 7→
[δ K¯ ,gK¯Y ], reciprocally, we have τ K¯ : [δ K¯ ,gK¯Y ] 7→ [δK ,gKY ]. It
is straightforward to see that matching rule characterized by
the above τK with δK is unique in the sense that it specifies
a unique cut-off type for each matched type on side K. It is
easy to see that the market if bottom-eliminated on side K
if λK∆ > λ
K and top-reserved on side K¯ if λK∆ = λ
K . From
Assumption 3, we have ηKY (λ
K , λ¯K)< 0.
Next consider that λK∆ = λ
K , in which there exists a
κ(λK) ∈ [gK¯Y , λ¯K ] such that ηKY (λK ,κ(λK)) = 0. Suppose
κ(λK)< λ¯ K¯ . From Assumption 3, ηKY (λ
K , λ¯ K¯)> 0. Hence,
we have that if ηKY (λ
K , λ¯ K¯) > 0, the market is complete-
matched on side K¯ and top-reserved on side K. Finally,
consider κ(λK) = λ¯ K¯ , in which δK = λK and τK(λK) = λ¯ K¯ ,
i.e., the market is not top-reserved on side K¯ and complete-
matched on side K.
